Corporate Governance and Shareholders’ Interests: Concept of the Maximization of the Market Values of Companies

Bukvić, Rajko and Rajnović, Ljiljana (2020) Corporate Governance and Shareholders’ Interests: Concept of the Maximization of the Market Values of Companies. In: Большая Евразия: Развитие, безопасность, сотрудничество. Ежегодник. Выпуск 3. Часть 1. Moskva, РАН. ИНИОН, сотрудничества; Отв. ред. В.И. Герасимов, pp. 283-290. ISBN 978-5-248-00956-5

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Abstract

One of the basic and widely represented corporate governance settings is corporate governance in the interests of shareholders, or company owners. This concept is based on the arguments that the owners have the strongest interest in the company and that the efficiency of the business depends directly on this interest, while at the same time the interests of shareholders are at least protected among the interests of all constituents. In some countries, this concept has been elevated to the absolute (in the United States as the only interest to be protected, the interest of shareholders is emphasized), but where this is not the case, or where the interests of other constituents are respected, the interest of the shareholders is inviolable and stands out in the first plan. The paper discusses the basis and modalities that motivate different forms of corporate governance in different countries and different conditions, as well as the consequences that such requirements and their fulfillment produce. In particular, the crash of the concept of maximizing the market value of shares, which was extremely popular in the last decades of the 20th and the beginning of this century, is particularly indicative.

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